

# AL-QAEDA, US OIL COMPANIES AND CENTRAL ASIA

**The cosy relationship between US petroleum corporations, the US government and the military in the 1990s destabilised Central Asia and the Balkans and fostered the spread of Islamist jihadists as well as the flow of Afghan heroin.**

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From chapter 9 of his  
forthcoming book *The Road to 9/11*

*The then leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Sayed Kuttub, a man Faisal sponsored to undermine Nasser, openly admitted that during this period [the 1960s] "America made Islam".*

— Saïd K. Avburish, in  
*The Rise, Corruption and the Coming Fall of the House of Saud* (1995)<sup>1</sup>

What is slowly emerging from al-Qaeda [al-Qa'ida] activities in Central Asia in the 1990s is the extent to which they involved both American oil companies and the US government.<sup>2</sup> By now we know that the US-protected movements of al-Qaeda terrorists into regions like Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Kosovo have served the interests of US oil companies. In many cases they have also provided pretexts or opportunities for a US military commitment and even troops to follow.

This has been most obvious in the years since the Afghanistan war with the Soviet Union ended in 1989. Deprived of Soviet troops to support it, the Soviet-backed Najibullah regime in Kabul finally fell in April 1992. What should have been a glorious victory for the mujahedin proved instead to be a time of troubles for them, as Tajiks behind Massoud and Pashtuns behind Hekmatyar began instead to fight each other.

The situation was particularly difficult for the Arab Afghans, who now found themselves no longer welcome. Under pressure from America, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the new interim president of Afghanistan, Mojaddedi, announced that the Arab Afghans should leave. In January 1993, Pakistan followed suit, closed the offices of all mujahedin in its country and ordered the deportation of all Arab Afghans.<sup>3</sup> Shortly afterwards, Pakistan extradited a number of Egyptian jihadists to Egypt, some of whom had already been tried and convicted *in absentia*.<sup>4</sup> Other radical Islamists went to Afghanistan, but without the foreign support they had enjoyed before.

Fleeing the hostilities in Afghanistan, some Uzbek and Tajik mujahedin and refugees started fleeing or returning north across the Amu Darya.<sup>5</sup> In this confusion, with or without continued US backing, cross-border raids—of the kind originally encouraged by CIA director Casey back in the mid-1980s—continued.<sup>6</sup> Both Hekmatyar and Massoud actively supported the Tajik rebels, including in the years up to 1992 when both continued to receive aid and assistance from the United States.<sup>7</sup> The Pakistani observer Ahmed Rashid documents further support for the Tajik rebels from both Saudi Arabia and the Pakistani intelligence directorate ISI.<sup>8</sup>

These raids into Tajikistan and later Uzbekistan contributed materially to the destabilisation of the Muslim republics in the Soviet Union (and after 1992 of its successor, the Commonwealth of Independent States). This destabilisation was an explicit goal of US policy in the Reagan era, and did not change with the end of the Afghanistan war. On the contrary, the United States was concerned to hasten the break-up of the Soviet Union and increasingly to gain access to the petroleum reserves of the Caspian Basin, which at that time were still estimated to be "the largest known reserves of unexploited fuel in the planet".<sup>9</sup>

The collapse of the Soviet Union had a disastrous impact on the economies of its Islamic republics. Already in 1991, the leaders of Central Asia "began to hold talks with Western oil companies, on the back of ongoing negotiations between Kazakhstan and the US company Chevron".<sup>10</sup> The first Bush administration actively supported the plans of US oil companies to contract for exploiting the resources of the Caspian region, and also for a pipeline not controlled by Moscow that could bring the oil and gas production out to the

West. The same goals were enunciated even more clearly as matters of national security by Clinton and his administration.<sup>11</sup>

Eventually the threat presented by Islamist rebels persuaded the governments of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to allow American as well as Russian bases on their soil. The result was to preserve artificially a situation throughout the region where small elites grow increasingly wealthy and corrupt, while most citizens suffer from a sharp drop in living standards.<sup>12</sup>

The gap between the present Bush administration's professed ideals and its real objectives is well illustrated by its position towards the regime of Karimov in Uzbekistan. America quickly sent Donald Rumsfeld to deal with the new regime in Kyrgyzstan, installed in March 2005 after the popular "Tulip Revolution" and overthrow of Askar Akayev.<sup>13</sup> But Islam Karimov's violent repression of a similar uprising in Uzbekistan saw no wavering of US support for a dictator who has allowed US troops to be based in his oil- and gas-rich country.<sup>14</sup>

### US Operatives, Big Oil and Al-Qaeda in Azerbaijan

In one former Soviet Republic, Azerbaijan, Arab Afghan jihadists clearly assisted this effort of US oil companies to penetrate the region. In 1991, Richard Secord, Heinie Aderholt and Ed Dearborn, three veterans of US operations in Laos and later of Oliver North's operations with the Contras, turned up in Baku under the cover of an oil company, MEGA Oil.<sup>15</sup> This was at a time when the first Bush administration had expressed its support for an oil pipeline stretching from Azerbaijan across the Caucasus to Turkey.<sup>16</sup> MEGA never did find oil, but did contribute materially to the removal of Azerbaijan from the sphere of post-Soviet Russian influence.

Secord, Aderholt and Dearborn were all career US Air Force officers, not CIA. However Secord explains in his memoir [*Honored and Betrayed*, 1992] how Aderholt and he were occasionally seconded to the CIA as CIA detailees. Secord describes his own service as a CIA detailee with Air America, first in Vietnam and then in Laos, in cooperation with the CIA station chief Theodore Shackley.<sup>17</sup> Secord later worked with Oliver North to supply arms and materiel to the Contras in Honduras and also developed a small air force for them, using many former Air America pilots.<sup>18</sup> Because of this experience in air operations, CIA director Casey and Oliver North had selected Secord to trouble-shoot the deliveries of weapons to Iran in the Iran-Contra operation.<sup>19</sup> (Aderholt and Dearborn also served in the Laotian CIA operation and later in support of the Contras.)

As MEGA operatives in Azerbaijan, Secord, Aderholt, Dearborn and their men engaged in military training, passed "brown bags filled with cash" to members of the government and, above all, set up an airline on the model of Air America which soon was picking up hundreds of mujahedin mercenaries in Afghanistan.<sup>20</sup> (Secord and Aderholt claim to have left Azerbaijan before the mujahedin arrived.) Meanwhile, Hekmatyar, who at the time was still allied with bin Laden, was "observed recruiting Afghan mercenaries [i.e., Arab Afghans] to fight in Azerbaijan against Armenia and its Russian allies".<sup>21</sup> At this time, heroin flooded from Afghanistan through Baku into Chechnya, Russia and even North America.<sup>22</sup>

It is difficult to believe that MEGA's airline (so much like Air

America) did not become involved.<sup>23</sup> The operation was not a small one.

*Over the course of the next two years, [MEGA Oil] procured thousands of dollars worth of weapons and recruited at least two thousand Afghan mercenaries for Azerbaijan—the first mujahedin to fight on the territory of the former Communist Bloc.*<sup>24</sup>

In 1993, the mujahedin also contributed to the ousting of Azerbaijan's elected president, Abulfaz Elchibey, and his replacement by an ex-Communist Brezhnev-era leader, Heidar Aliyev.

At stake was a US\$8 billion oil contract with a consortium of Western oil companies headed by BP. Part of the contract would be a pipeline which, for the first time, would not pass through Russian-controlled territory when exporting oil from the Caspian Basin to Turkey. Thus the contract was bitterly opposed by Russia, and required an Azeri leader willing to stand up to the former Soviet Union.

The Arab Afghans helped supply that muscle. Their own eyes

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were set on fighting Russia in the disputed Armenian-Azeri region of Nagorno-Karabakh, and in liberating the neighbouring Muslim areas of Russia, i.e., Chechnya and Dagestan.<sup>25</sup> To this end, as *The 9/11 Commission Report* notes (p. 58), the bin Laden organisation established an NGO in Baku, which became a base for terrorism elsewhere.<sup>26</sup> It also became a transshipment point for Afghan heroin to the Chechen mafia, whose branches "extended not only to the London arms market, but also throughout continental Europe and North America".<sup>27</sup>

The Arab Afghans' Azeri operations were financed in part with Afghan heroin.

*According to police sources in the Russian capital, 184 heroin processing labs were discovered in Moscow alone last year [1991].*

*"Every one of them was run by Azeris, who use the proceeds to buy arms for Azerbaijan's war against Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh," [Russian economist Alexandre] Datskevitch said.*<sup>28</sup>

This foreign Islamist presence in Baku was also supported by bin Laden's financial network.<sup>29</sup> With bin Laden's guidance and Saudi support, Baku soon became a base for jihadist operations against Dagestan and Chechnya in Russia.<sup>30</sup> And an informed article argued in 1999 that Pakistan's ISI, facing its own disposal problem with the militant Arab Afghan veterans, trained and armed them in Afghanistan to fight in Chechnya. ISI also encouraged the flow of Afghan drugs westward to support the Chechen militants, thus diminishing the flow into Pakistan itself.<sup>31</sup>

As Michael Griffin has observed [*Reaping the Whirlwind*, 2001], the regional conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and other disputed areas, Abkhazia, Turkish Kurdistan and Chechnya...

*...each represented a distinct, tactical move, crucial at the time, in discerning which power would ultimately become master of the pipelines which, some time in this century, will transport the oil and gas from the Caspian basin to an energy-avid world.*<sup>32</sup>

The wealthy Saudi families of al-Alamoudi (as Delta Oil) and bin Mahfouz (as Nimir Oil) participated in the Western oil consortium along with the American firm Unocal. In October 2001, the US Treasury Department named among charities allegedly supporting terrorism the Saudi charity Muwafaq (Blessed Relief), to which the al-Alamoudis and bin Mahfouz families had been identified as major contributors.<sup>33</sup> (It should be noted that the entire bin Mahfouz family has emphatically condemned terrorism in all of its manifestations.)

It is unclear whether MEGA Oil was a front for the US government or for US oil companies and their Saudi allies. US oil companies have been accused of spending millions of dollars in Azerbaijan, not just to bribe the government but also to install it. According to a Turkish intelligence source who is an alleged eyewitness, major oil companies including Exxon and Mobil were "behind the *coup d'état*" which in 1993 replaced the elected president, Abulfaz Elchibey, with his successor, Heydar Aliyev. The source claimed to have been at meetings in Baku with "senior members of BP, Exxon, Amoco, Mobil and the Turkish Petroleum Company". "The topic was always oil rights and, on the insistence of the Azeris, supply of arms and mercenaries to Azerbaijan." Turkish secret service documents allege middlemen paid off key officials of the democratically elected government of the oil-rich nation just before its president was overthrown.<sup>34</sup>

The true facts and backers of the Aliyev coup may never be fully disclosed. But unquestionably before the coup, the efforts of Richard Secord, Heinie Aderholt, Ed Dearborn and Hekmatyar's mujahedin helped contest Russian influence and prepare for Baku's shift away to the West.<sup>35</sup> Three years later, in August 1996, Amoco's president met with US President Clinton and arranged for Aliyev to be invited to Washington.<sup>36</sup> In 1997, Clinton said:

*In a world of growing energy demand...our nation cannot afford to rely on a single region for our energy supplies. By working closely with Azerbaijan to tap the Caspian's resources, we not only help Azerbaijan to prosper, we also help diversify our energy supply and strengthen our energy's security.*<sup>37</sup>

### Unocal, the Taliban and Bin Laden in Afghanistan

The accusations against Amoco, Exxon and Mobil in Azerbaijan parallel those from European sources against Unocal in Afghanistan, which has been accused, along with Delta Oil, of helping to finance the Taliban's seizure of Kabul in 1996. (This was at a time when the Taliban was also receiving funds from Saudi Arabia and Osama bin Laden.)

The respected French observer Olivier Roy has charged: "When the Taliban took power in Afghanistan (1996), it was largely orchestrated by the Pakistani secret service [ISI] and the oil company Unocal, with its Saudi ally Delta."<sup>38</sup> Unocal executive John Maresca then testified in 1998 to the House Committee on International Relations on the benefits of a proposed oil pipeline through Afghanistan to the coast of Pakistan.<sup>39</sup> A second natural gas pipeline (Centgas) was also contemplated by Unocal.

For Unocal to advance its own funds for the Taliban conquest would have been in violation of US law, which is why such companies customarily resort to middlemen. No such restraints would have inhibited Unocal's Saudi partner in its Centgas consortium, Delta Oil. Delta Oil certainly had the assets; it was "owned by a Jeddah-based group of 50 prominent investors close to the [Saudi] royal family".<sup>40</sup> Delta was already an investor with Unocal in the oilfields of Azerbaijan, and may have been a factor in the October 1995 decision of Turkmenistan to sign a new pipeline contract with Unocal.<sup>41</sup>

As I wrote a decade ago, citing the case of a US oil company in Tunisia, "it is normal, not unusual, for the entry of major US firms into Third World countries to be facilitated and sustained, indeed made possible, by corruption".<sup>42</sup> This has long been the case, but in the Reagan 1980s it was escalated by a new generation of aggressively risk-taking, law-bending, "cowboy" entrepreneurs.

The pace was set by new corporations like Enron, a high-debt merger that was in part guided by the junk-bond impresario Michael Milken.

Some have speculated that Enron also had a potential interest in the Unocal gas pipeline project through Afghanistan. By 1997, Enron was negotiating a \$2 billion joint venture with Neftegaz of Uzbekistan to develop Uzbekistan's natural gas. This was a huge project backed by a \$400 million commitment from the US government through OPIC [the Overseas Private Investment Corporation]. Uzbekistan also signed a memo of agreement

to participate in the Centgas gas pipeline. But the Enron Uzbek negotiations collapsed in 1998.<sup>43</sup>

Enron's short-term plans had been to export Uzbek gas west to Kazakhstan, Turkey and Europe. However, it has been claimed that Enron hoped eventually to supply, via the Centgas pipeline, its failing energy plant in Dabhol, India. (Without a cheap gas supply, the cost of electricity from Dabhol was so great that Indians refused to buy it.)<sup>44</sup>

In my book *Drugs, Oil and War*, I

quote again from Olivier Roy:

*It is the Americans who have made inroads in Central Asia, primarily because of the oil and gas interests. Chevron and Unocal are political actors who talk as equals with the States (that is, with the presidents).*<sup>45</sup>

It is clear they talk as equals in the current Bush administration. Both the president and vice-president are former oilmen, as are some of their oldest friends and political backers, like Kenneth Lay of Enron.<sup>46</sup> Many observers have noted, from as early as 1992, that George W. Bush's first oil venture, Arbusto, received a \$50,000 investment from a Texan, James Bath, "who made his fortune by investing money for [Khalid bin] Mahfouz and another BCCI-connected Saudi, Sheikh [Salim] bin Laden [Osama's brother]".<sup>47</sup> Such little investments purchased political influence. According to Kevin Phillips [*American Dynasty*, 2004]:

*James Bath, who invested fifty thousand dollars in the 1979 and 1980 Arbusto partnerships, probably did so as US business representative for rich Saudi investors Salem bin*

**"When the Taliban took power in Afghanistan (1996), it was largely orchestrated by the Pakistani secret service [ISI] and the oil company Unocal, with its Saudi ally Delta."**

*Laden and Khalid bin Mahfouz... Both men were involved with the Bank of Credit and Commerce International... indeed, bin Mahfouz owned twenty percent of its stock... A decade later, Harken Energy, the company willing to handsomely buy out George W.'s crumbling oil and gas business, had its own CIA connections...17.6 percent of Harken's stock was owned by Abdullah Baksh, another Saudi magnate reported by some to be representing Khalid bin Mahfouz.*<sup>48</sup>

(Khalid bin Mahfouz, however, has categorically denied being an investor in either Arbusto or Harken Energy.)

### **Al-Qaeda, the KLA in Kosovo and the Trans-Balkan Pipeline**

The United States, al-Qaeda and oil company interests converged again in Kosovo. Though the origins of the Kosovo tragedy were rooted in local enmities, oil became a prominent aspect of the outcome. There the al-Qaeda-backed UCK or "Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA) was directly supported and politically empowered by NATO, beginning in 1998.<sup>49</sup> But according to a source of Tim Judah, KLA representatives had already met with American, British and Swiss intelligence agencies in 1996 and possibly "several years earlier".<sup>50</sup> This would presumably have been back when Arab Afghan members of the KLA, like Abdul-Wahid al-Qahtani, were fighting in Bosnia.<sup>51</sup>

Mainstream accounts of the Kosovo war are silent about the role of al-Qaeda in training and financing the UCK/KLA, yet this fact has been recognised by experts and to my knowledge has never been contested by them.<sup>52</sup> For example, James Bissett, former Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia, said: *Many members of the Kosovo Liberation Army were sent for training in terrorist camps in Afghanistan... Milosevic is right. There is no question of their [al-Qaeda's] participation in conflicts in the Balkans. It is very well documented.*<sup>53</sup>

In March 2002, Michael Steiner, the United Nations administrator in Kosovo, warned of "importing the Afghan danger to Europe" because several cells trained and financed by al-Qaeda remained in the region.<sup>54</sup>

As late as 1997, the UCK/KLA had been recognised by the US as a terrorist group supported in part by the heroin traffic.<sup>55</sup>

The *Washington Times* reported in 1999 [May 3]: *The Kosovo Liberation Army, which the Clinton administration has embraced and some members of Congress want to arm as part of the NATO bombing campaign, is a terrorist organization that has financed much of its war effort with profits from the sale of heroin.*<sup>56</sup>

Alfred McCoy supplies a detailed and footnoted corroboration [*The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, 2001 ed.]: *Albanian exiles used drug profits to ship Czech and Swiss arms back to Kosovo for the separatist guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In 1997–98, these Kosovar drug syndicates armed the KLA for a revolt against*

*Belgrade's army... Even after the 1999 Kumanovo agreement settled the Kosovo conflict, the UN administration of the province...allowed a thriving heroin traffic along this northern route from Turkey. The former commanders of the KLA, both local clans and aspiring national leaders, continued to dominate the transit traffic through the Balkans.*<sup>57</sup>

Yet once again, as in Azerbaijan, these drug-financed Islamist jihadists received American assistance, this time from the US government.<sup>58</sup> At the time, critics charged that US oil interests were interested in building a trans-Balkan pipeline with US Army protection; although initially ridiculed, these critics were eventually proven correct.<sup>59</sup> BBC News announced in December 2004 that a \$1.2 billion pipeline, south of a huge new US Army base in Kosovo, has been given a go-ahead by the governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia.<sup>60</sup>

The closeness of the UCK/KLA to al-Qaeda was acknowledged again in the Western press after Afghan-connected KLA guerrillas proceeded in 2001 to conduct guerrilla warfare in

Macedonia. Press accounts included an Interpol report containing the allegation that one of bin Laden's senior lieutenants was the commander of an elite UCK/KLA unit operating in Kosovo in 1999.<sup>61</sup> This was probably Mohammed al-Zawahiri.

The American right wing, which opposed Clinton's actions in Kosovo, transmitted reports that "the KLA's head of elite forces, Muhammed al-Zawahiri, was the brother of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the military commander for bin Laden's Al-Qaeda".<sup>62</sup> Meanwhile, Marcia Kurop in the *Wall Street Journal Europe* [November 1,

2001] wrote: "The Egyptian surgeon turned terrorist leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has operated terrorist training camps, weapons of mass destruction factories and money-laundering and drug-trading networks throughout Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Turkey and Bosnia."<sup>63</sup>

According to Yossef Bodansky, director of the US Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare:

*Bin Laden's Arab "Afghans" also have assumed a dominant role in training the Kosovo Liberation Army... [By mid-March 1999, the UCK included] many elements controlled and/or sponsored by the US, German, British, and Croatian intelligence services.*<sup>64</sup>

Meantime, by 2000, according to DEA statistics, Afghan heroin accounted for almost 20 per cent of the heroin seized in the United States—nearly double the percentage taken four years earlier. Much of it is now distributed by Kosovar Albanians.<sup>65</sup>

### **Al-Qaeda and the Petroleum-Military Complex**

It is important to understand that the conspicuous influence of petroleum money in the administrations of two Bush presidents was also prominent under Clinton.

Former CIA officer Robert Baer [*See No Evil*, 2002] complained about the oil lobby's influence with Sheila Heslin of Clinton's National Security Council staff:

*Heslin's sole job, it seemed, was to carry water for an*

**The United States, al-Qaeda and oil company interests converged again in Kosovo.**

exclusive club known as the Foreign Oil Companies Group, a cover for a cartel of major petroleum companies doing business in the Caspian...

Another thing I learned was that Heslin wasn't soloing. Her boss, Deputy National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, headed the inter-agency committee on Caspian oil policy, which made him in effect the government's ambassador to the cartel, and Berger wasn't a disinterested player. He held \$90,000 worth of stock in Amoco, probably the most influential member of the cartel... The deeper I got, the more Caspian oil money I found sloshing around Washington.<sup>69</sup>

The oil companies' meeting with Sheila Heslin in the summer of 1995 was followed shortly by the creation of an interagency governmental committee to formulate US policy towards the Caspian.

The Clinton administration listened to the oil companies, and in 1998 began committing US troops to joint training exercises in Uzbekistan.<sup>70</sup> This made neighbouring countries like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan wary of Russia and more eager to grant exploration and pipeline rights to American companies.<sup>71</sup>

But Clinton did not yield to Unocal's strenuous lobbying in 1996 for US recognition of the Taliban as a condition for building the pipeline from Turkmenistan. Clinton declined in the end to do so, responding instead to the strongly voiced political opposition, especially from women's groups over the Taliban's treatment of women.<sup>72</sup>

The three-way symbiosis of al-Qaeda, oil companies and the Pentagon is still visible in the case of Azerbaijan, for example. Now the Pentagon is protecting the Aliyev regime (where a younger Aliyev, in a dubious election, succeeded his father).

*The Department of Defense at first proposed that Azerbaijan also receive an IMET [International Military Education and Training] grant of \$750,000 and an FMF [Foreign Military Financing] grant of \$3 million in 2003 as part of the war on terrorism but later admitted that the funds were actually intended to protect US access to oil in and around the Caspian Sea.*<sup>73</sup>

We have seen that, thanks to al-Qaeda, US bases have sprung up close to oilfields and pipelines in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Georgia and Kosovo. And as Michael Klare has noted [*Blood and Oil*, 2004]:

*Already [US] troops from the Southern Command (Southcom) are helping to defend Colombia's Cano Limón pipeline... Likewise, soldiers from the European Command (Eurcom) are training local forces to protect the newly constructed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in Georgia... Finally, the ships and planes of the US Pacific Command (Pacom) are patrolling vital tanker routes in the Indian Ocean, South China Sea, and the western Pacific... Slowly*

*but surely, the US military is being converted into a global oil-protection service.*<sup>74</sup>

A survey of US history since World War Two suggests that the United States power state has consistently used the resources of the global drug traffic to further its own ends, particularly with respect to oil, at the expense of the public order and well-being of the American public state.<sup>75</sup>

For at least two decades, from Brzezinski's backing of Hekmatyar in 1979 to Bush's backing of the Afghan Northern Alliance in 2001, the United States has continued to draw on the resources of drug-trafficking Islamist jihadists who are or were associated at some point with al-Qaeda. In my book I argue that this alliance with al-Qaeda terrorists against the United States public order underlies the conspiracy that made 9/11 possible. But we must also look at how the military-petroleum complex came to project long-term military budgets, in the order of a trillion dollars, that its advocates acknowledged the American public state could not be persuaded easily to support...

In the absence, that is, of "some catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor".<sup>76</sup>

#### **Editor's Note:**

We are unable to publish the endnotes accompanying this article due to their extensive nature and our lack of space. However, readers can view and download them from the author's web page at [http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~pdscott/AAACHap9aAzerb.htm#\\_ftn58](http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~pdscott/AAACHap9aAzerb.htm#_ftn58). This paper is an extract from chapter 9 of Peter Dale Scott's forthcoming book *The Road to 9/11*; it was first posted in July and revised in September 2005.

#### **About the Author:**

Born in Montreal in 1929, Peter Dale Scott is a poet, writer and researcher. He is a former Canadian diplomat and was professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley, from 1980 until his retirement in 1994. He has a BA from McGill University, Montreal, with first-class honours in philosophy (1949) and a PhD in Political Science, also from McGill (1955).

An anti-war speaker during the Vietnam and Gulf Wars, Dr Scott co-founded the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at UC Berkeley, and the Coalition on Political Assassinations (COPA). His prose books include *The War Conspiracy* (1972), *Crime and Cover-up* (1977), *Deep Politics and the Death of JFK* (1993, 1996), and *Drugs, Oil and War* (2003). He has written numerous articles and collaborated on books and papers with other researchers on diverse subjects such as international relations, deep politics, peace studies and spirituality. In 2002 he received the prestigious Lannan Award for his poetry.

For more details about Peter Dale Scott and his work, visit his websites at <http://www.peterdalescott.net> and <http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~pdscott>. Dr Scott has a separate web page on War, 9/11, Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda, Drugs, Oil, Iraq, etc. at <http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~pdscott/q.html>.

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